Models for conflict resolution in ecosystem management
Tipo de material:
TextoSeries ; Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 33, p.61-84, 1999Trabajos contenidos: - Shields, D.J
- Tolwinski, B
- Kent, B.M
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CICY Documento préstamo interbibliotecario | Ref1 | B-10084 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available |
Tools developed in the ®elds of decision analysis and game theory that have potential for use in public sector con¯ict resolution are reviewed. The strengths and weaknesses, as well as the axioms de®ning principles of fairness, are examined for multiobjective optimization, Nash and Nash±Harsanyi solutions, voting models, and the Shapley value. The case of con¯ict between stakeholders over proposed oil and gas leasing on National Forest System lands is presented as a sample application. We conclude that the Shapley value is the appropriate approach for etermining the ``fairness'' of alternative con¯ict solutions, at least in those situations where cardinal utilities can be estimated.
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