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090			_aB-10084
245	1	0	_aModels for conflict resolution in ecosystem management
490	0		_vSocio-Economic Planning Sciences, 33, p.61-84, 1999
520	3		_aTools developed in the ®elds of decision analysis and game theory that have potential for use in public sector con¯ict resolution are reviewed. The strengths and weaknesses, as well as the axioms de®ning principles of fairness, are examined for multiobjective optimization, Nash and Nash±Harsanyi solutions, voting models, and the Shapley value. The case of con¯ict between stakeholders over proposed oil and gas leasing on National Forest System lands is presented as a sample application. We conclude that the Shapley value is the appropriate approach for etermining the ``fairness'' of alternative con¯ict solutions, at least in those situations where cardinal utilities can be estimated.
700	1	2	_aShields, D.J.
700	1	2	_aTolwinski, B.
700	1	2	_aKent, B.M.
856	4	0	_uhttps://drive.google.com/file/d/1k_XDMRcHoiRsxjQby4iKi_7e7xDep3Qw/view?usp=drivesdk _zPara ver el documento ingresa a Google con tu cuenta: @cicy.edu.mx
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