000 03361nam a22004335i 4500
001 978-0-387-22975-1
003 DE-He213
005 20250710083926.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2005 xxu| s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9780387229751
_a99780387229751
024 7 _a10.1007/b100254
_2doi
082 0 4 _a150.9
_223
100 1 _aHibberd, Fiona J.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aUnfolding Social Constructionism
_h[recurso electrónico] /
_cby Fiona J. Hibberd.
264 1 _aBoston, MA :
_bSpringer US,
_c2005.
300 _aXVIII, 207 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _arecurso en línea
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aHistory and Philosophy of Psychology
505 0 _aSocial Constructionism as a Metatheory of Psychological Science -- Relativism and Self-Refutation -- Non-Factualism -- The Received View of Logical Positivism and Its Relationship to Social Constructionism -- Conventionalism -- Meaning as Use -- Phenomenalism and Its Analogue -- Conclusions and Speculations.
520 _aThis book examines social constructionism as a metatheory of psychology. It does not consider constructionist accounts of psycho-social phenomena, but it does assess certain assumptions which are said to underpin those accounts, assumptions which are primarily semantic and epistemological. The first part of the book explains why the charges of relativism and self-refutation leveled at social constructionism miss their target, and it considers a constructionist attempt to defend the metatheory by appropriating the concept of performative utterances. The second part of the book challenges the generally accepted view that social constructionism is antithetical to positivist philosophy of science. This is done via an examination of the doctrine of conventionalism, constitutive relations, dualism, Wittgenstein's meaning-as-use thesis, verificationism, operationism, linguistic phenomenalism, and Kant's limitations of human knowledge. It is shown that, in certain respects, these topics unite social constructionism with its bête noire logical positivism, and that psychology's repeated endorsement of these ideas hinders the development of a rigorous psycho-social science. The book ends with a brief, speculative section in which it is suggested that the skepticism and internalism of social constructionist metatheory is an unconscious strategy of survival against failure. Fiona J. Hibberd is lecturer in the School of Psychology, University of Sydney. She specializes in the history, theory and philosophy of psychology, and in theories of personality, and has published in theoretical journals in the social sciences.
650 0 _aPHILOSOPHY (GENERAL).
650 0 _aCONSCIOUSNESS.
650 0 _aPSYCHOLOGY
_xHISTORY.
650 1 4 _aPSYCHOLOGY.
650 2 4 _aHISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY.
650 2 4 _aPERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9780387229744
830 0 _aHistory and Philosophy of Psychology
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/b100254
_zVer el texto completo en las instalaciones del CICY
912 _aZDB-2-BHS
942 _2ddc
_cER
999 _c56123
_d56123