000 04469nam a22004935i 4500
001 978-0-387-78707-7
003 DE-He213
005 20251006084419.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 110413s2009 xxu| s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9780387787077
020 _a99780387787077
024 7 _a10.1007/978-0-387-78707-7
_2doi
082 0 4 _a336
_223
100 1 _aFalaschetti, Dino.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aDemocratic Governance and Economic Performance
_h[electronic resource] :
_bHow Accountability Can Go Too Far in Politics, Law, and Business /
_cby Dino Falaschetti.
264 1 _aNew York, NY :
_bSpringer New York,
_c2009.
300 _aXXI, 131 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aStudies in Public Choice,
_x0924-4700 ;
_v14
505 0 _aA General Theory and Statistical Evidence -- Theory -- Natural Experiments -- Statistical Evidence -- Implications for Political Bureaucracy, Competition Law, and Business Organization -- Politics -- Law -- Business -- Conclusion.
520 _aConventional wisdom warns that unaccountable political and business agents can enrich a few at the expense of many. But logically extending this wisdom implies that associated principals - voters, consumers, shareholders - will favor themselves over the greater good when 'rules of the game' instead create too much accountability. Democratic Governance and Economic Performance rigorously develops this hypothesis, and finds statistical evidence and case study illustrations that democratic institutions at various governance levels (e.g., federal, state, corporation) have facilitated opportunistic gains for electoral, consumer, and shareholder principals. To be sure, this conclusion does not dismiss the potential for democratic governance to productively reduce agency costs. Rather, it suggests that policy makers, lawyers, and managers can improve governance by weighing the agency benefits of increased accountability against the distributional costs of favoring principal stakeholders over more general economic opportunities. Carefully considering the fundamentals that give rise to this tradeoff should interest students and scholars working at the intersection of social science and the law, and can help professionals improve their own performance in policy, legal, and business settings. Falaschetti skillfully synthesizes key ideas from social choice theory, organizational economics, and interest group politics to challenge conventional wisdom about the benefits of democratic governance in organizations. This is an important book for reforming how financial institutions are regulated, and corporations are governed, in the wake of the great financial market collapse of 2008. (Margaret Blair, Vanderbilt Law) The scope of Democratic Governance and Economic Performance is truly commendable. While legal scholars, economists, and political scientists have raised parts of these issues before, by addressing the topic from both theoretical and empirical levels, this book provides useful perspective to anyone interested in the relationship between governance institutions and firm performance. (Jon Klick, Penn Law) This insightful book shares with Madison's "Federalist #10" a concern for potentially disruptive effects from "majority factions." Falaschetti reminds us that some of our most costly policies result from democratic responsiveness, while some of our most successful policies come from organizations (e.g. courts, the Fed) that insulate us from democratic pressures. (Gary Miller, Washington University, Political Science)
650 0 _aECONOMICS.
650 0 _aFINANCE.
650 0 _aCOMMERCIAL LAW.
650 0 _aBUSINESS PLANNING.
650 0 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE.
650 1 4 _aECONOMICS/MANAGEMENT SCIENCE.
650 2 4 _aPUBLIC FINANCE & ECONOMICS.
650 2 4 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE.
650 2 4 _aLAW AND ECONOMICS.
650 2 4 _aORGANIZATION/PLANNING.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9780387787060
830 0 _aStudies in Public Choice,
_x0924-4700 ;
_v14
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-78707-7
_zVer el texto completo en las instalaciones del CICY
912 _aZDB-2-SBE
942 _2ddc
_cER
999 _c59103
_d59103