000 04058nam a22005175i 4500
001 978-0-387-87767-9
003 DE-He213
005 20251006084427.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 110406s2009 xxu| s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9780387877679
020 _a99780387877679
024 7 _a10.1007/978-0-387-87767-9
_2doi
100 1 _aBier, Vicki M.
_eeditor.
245 1 0 _aGame Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats
_h[electronic resource] /
_cedited by Vicki M. Bier, M. Naceur Azaiez.
264 1 _aBoston, MA :
_bSpringer US,
_c2009.
300 _aVI, 242p. 46 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aInternational Series in Operations Research & Management Science,
_x0884-8289 ;
_v128
505 0 _aWhy Both Game Theory and Reliability Theory Are Important in Defending Infrastructure against Intelligent Attacks -- Game Theory Models of Intelligent Actors in Reliability Analysis: An Overview of the State of the Art -- Optimizing Defense Strategies for Complex Multi-State Systems -- Defending Against Terrorism, Natural Disaster, and All Hazards -- A Bayesian Model for a Game of Information in Optimal Attack/Defense Strategies -- Search for a Malevolent Needle in a Benign Haystack -- Games and Risk Analysis: Three Examples of Single and Alternate Moves -- Making Telecommunications Networks Resilient against Terrorist Attacks -- Improving Reliability through Multi-Path Routing and Link Defence: An Application of Game Theory to Transport.
520 _aGame Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models will be developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book's primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into unified techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity. In this book, leading researchers combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used by security personnel to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including the threats of terrorism and war). This means a comprehensive treatment of such problems must consider two aspects: (1) the structure of the system to be protected and (2) the adaptive nature of the threat (that is, beyond the static nature of the threat). The book provides a set of scientific tools for analyzing and applying game-theoretic reliability problems in the presence of intentional, intelligent threats. These scientific tools address problems of global safety and create more cost-effective defensive investments.
650 0 _aENGINEERING.
650 0 _aMATHEMATICS.
650 0 _aINDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING.
650 0 _aSYSTEM SAFETY.
650 0 _aSTRUCTURAL CONTROL (ENGINEERING).
650 1 4 _aENGINEERING.
650 2 4 _aQUALITY CONTROL, RELIABILITY, SAFETY AND RISK.
650 2 4 _aGAME THEORY, ECONOMICS, SOCIAL AND BEHAV. SCIENCES.
650 2 4 _aAPPLICATIONS OF MATHEMATICS.
650 2 4 _aINDUSTRIAL AND PRODUCTION ENGINEERING.
650 2 4 _aOPERATIONS RESEARCH/DECISION THEORY.
650 2 4 _aOPERATING PROCEDURES, MATERIALS TREATMENT.
700 1 _aAzaiez, M. Naceur.
_eeditor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9780387877662
830 0 _aInternational Series in Operations Research & Management Science,
_x0884-8289 ;
_v128
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-87767-9
_zVer el texto completo en las instalaciones del CICY
912 _aZDB-2-ENG
942 _2ddc
_cER
999 _c59341
_d59341