000			04129nam a22004815i 4500
001			978-0-387-98171-0
003			DE-He213
005			20251006084433.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			110315s2011 xxu| s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9780387981710
020			_a99780387981710
024	7		_a10.1007/978-0-387-98171-0 _2doi
082	0	4	_a320 _223
100	1		_aDougherty, Keith L. _eauthor.
245	1	4	_aThe Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design _h[electronic resource] / _cby Keith L. Dougherty, Julian Edward.
264		1	_aNew York, NY : _bSpringer New York, _c2011.
300			_aXII, 120 p. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	1		_aStudies in Public Choice, _x0924-4700 ; _v20
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Original Theories and Current Studies -- Clarifying Concepts -- Constitutional Decision Making -- Legislative Decision Making -- Electoral Decision Making -- Conclusion.
520			_aBuchanan and Tullock's seminal work, The Calculus of Consent, linked economic methodology to substantive questions in political science. Among the major contributions of their book is a connection between constitutional decision making and contractarianism, a philosophical tradition that proponents believe can give institutions legitimacy. In other words, a major contribution of their book is a clear connection between empirical decision making and normative principles. The current book formalizes and extends their foundational ideas as it attempts to show how economic and philosophical arguments about the "best" voting rules can be used to improve constitutional design. It informs debates about constitutional political economy in comparative politics, democratic theory, and public choice. Political scientists often ask questions about what causes a nation to seek a new constitution, how constitutions are made, and what factors allow for corrupt decision making. The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design bridges the gap between normative questions about which institutions are most efficient and fair and empirical questions about how constitutions are formed. This provides a benchmark to help create better constitutions and informs empirical research about what institutions are most likely to succeed. The book begins by showing how contractarian ideals can be used to justify choices about decision-making. It then carefully defines several concepts employed by Buchanan and Tullock and shows why the relationships between these concepts may not be as closely linked as Buchanan and Tullock first thought. This provides a backdrop for analyzing the three phases of constitutional decision-making: 1) the constitutional phase, where rules for constitutional decision making must be justified; 2) the legislative phase, where the optimal k-majority rule is analyzed; and 3) the electoral phase, where the optimal voting rule for large electorates and open alternatives are determined. These phases differ by context and sources of legitimacy. Computational models and analytic techniques are introduced in each of these chapters. Finally, the book concludes with statements about the significance of the research for the creation of constitutions more broadly.
650		0	_aSOCIAL SCIENCES.
650		0	_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE _xPHILOSOPHY.
650		0	_aSOCIAL SCIENCES _xMETHODOLOGY.
650		0	_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE.
650	1	4	_aSOCIAL SCIENCES.
650	2	4	_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE.
650	2	4	_aPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.
650	2	4	_aMETHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.
700	1		_aEdward, Julian. _eauthor.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9780387981703
830		0	_aStudies in Public Choice, _x0924-4700 ; _v20
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-98171-0 _zVer el texto completo en las instalaciones del CICY
912			_aZDB-2-SHU
942			_2ddc _cER
999			_c59598 _d59598