000			03801nam a22004335i 4500
001			978-1-4020-2581-5
003			DE-He213
005			20251006084448.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			100301s2005 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9781402025815
020			_a99781402025815
024	7		_a10.1007/1-4020-2581-5 _2doi
082	0	4	_a110 _223
100	1		_aSenderowicz, Yaron M. _eauthor.
245	1	4	_aThe Coherence of Kant's Transcendental Idealism _h[electronic resource] / _cby Yaron M. Senderowicz.
264		1	_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands, _c2005.
300			_aXIII, 295 p. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	1		_aStudies in German Idealism, _x1571-4764 ; _v4
505	0		_aA priori Knowledge -- Kant's Concept of the A Priori -- Skepticism and A Priori Knowledge -- The Skeptical Problem -- Transcendental Idealism -- The Transcendental Ideality of Space and Time: The Problem -- The Singularity and Immediacy of Intuitions -- The Immediacy of Space and Time -- The Non-Spatiotemporality of Things in Themselves -- Appearances, The Transcendental Object and the Noumenon -- Transcendental Synthesis -- The Concept of Transcendental Synthesis -- The Transcendental Deduction and Transcendental Synthesis -- The Inherent Ambiguity of "I Think" -- Self-Consciousness and Transcendental Synthesis -- The Analogies of Experience -- The Refutation of Idealism.
520			_aThis book presents a new interpretation of Kant's theory of knowledge that emphasizes the coherence and plausibility of his doctrine of transcendental idealism. Many interpreters believe that Kant's transcendental idealism is an incoherent theory. Some have attempted to respond to this charge. Yet, as the author demonstrates, the interpretations that seek to vindicate Kant's theory continue to be committed to some claims that evoke the charge of incoherence. One type of claim which does so is connected to the contradictory notion of subjective necessity. The other type of claim is related to the supposition that knowledge of the reality of appearances entails knowledge of the reality of things in themselves. The interpretation presented in this book does not involve any of these claims. Part One of this book presents an analysis of Kant's concept of a priori knowledge and of his response to skepticism about synthetic a priori knowledge that specifies the content of such knowledge without invoking the notion of subjective necessity. Part Two presents an account of the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves that does not entail knowledge of the reality of things in themselves. Part Three presents a new interpretation of transcendental synthesis, the transcendental "I" and of the role of transcendental self-consciousness in synthetic a priori knowledge which emphasizes the originality of Kant's account of self-knowledge and subjectivity. The arguments presented in this book relate Kant's ideas to current debates in epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of mind in a way that underscores their invaluable relevance to present-day philosophical discourse.
650		0	_aPHILOSOPHY (GENERAL).
650		0	_aMETAPHYSICS.
650	1	4	_aPHILOSOPHY.
650	2	4	_aMETAPHYSICS.
650	2	4	_aPHILOSOPHY.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9781402025808
830		0	_aStudies in German Idealism, _x1571-4764 ; _v4
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-2581-5 _zVer el texto completo en las instalaciones del CICY
912			_aZDB-2-SHU
942			_2ddc _cER
999			_c60242 _d60242