000 04185nam a22005175i 4500
001 978-1-4020-3888-4
003 DE-He213
005 20251006084501.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2006 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9781402038884
020 _a99781402038884
024 7 _a10.1007/1-4020-3888-7
_2doi
082 0 4 _a658.56
_223
100 1 _aLambert, Francis.
_eeditor.
245 1 0 _aSafety Improvements through Lessons Learned from Operational Experience in Nuclear Research Facilities
_h[electronic resource] /
_cedited by Francis Lambert, Yuri Volkov.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands,
_c2006.
300 _aIX, 208 p. With CD-ROM.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aNATO Security Through Science Series ;
_v4
505 0 _aHOW TO EXTRACT THE HIDDEN LESSONS FROM A SMALL INCIDENT ON A NUCLEAR RESEARCH FACILITY -- LEARNING FROM LOW LEVEL INCIDENTS -- THE EXPERIENCE OF EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN OF THE VVR-c REACTOR AFTER 40 YEARS OF OPERATION -- MINOR INCIDENTS DURING THE DECOMMISSIONING OF PROTOTYPE OPERATION AND RESEARCH FACILITIES OF THE KARLSRUHE RESEARCH CENTER -- ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION ON INCIDENTS AT RESEARCH NUCLEAR PLANTS IN RUSSIA -- PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE SAFETY OF RESEARCH NUCLEAR PLANTS IN RUSSIA -- SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS THROUGH LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN NUCLEAR RESEARCH FACILITIES -- THE RESPONSIBILITY OF HIGHER MANAGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE SAFETY POLICY OF RESEARCH CENTRES -- ORGANIZATION AND METHODS USED BY THE CEA SACLAY CENTRE TO IMPROVE OPERATING PROCEDURES AND PROMOTE BEST PRACTICES IN NUCLEAR RESEARCH FACILITIES -- ROLE OF THE HEALTH PHYSICS - SAFETY DEPARTMENT IN A NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE SAFETY AS AN UNCEASING PROCESS: THE -- THE LESSONS OF 48 YEARS' OPERATION OF THE AM RESEARCH REACTOR -- SUMMARY OF THE GENERAL DISCUSSIONS.
520 _aFor operators of nuclear research facilities, it is of particular importance to investigate minor incidents: indeed, as safety demonstrations are generally based on the presence of several independent "lines of defence", only through attentive investigation of every occurrence, usually minor and of no consequence, can the level of trust placed in each of these defensive lines be confirmed, or the potential risks arising out of a possible weakness in the system be anticipated. The efficiency of the system is based on a rigorous procedure: stringent attention to all incidents, consideration of the potential consequences of the incidents in their most pessimistic scenarios, and promotion of a broad conception of transpositions of the events, in time and space, for experience feedback. This efficiency presumes motivation on the part of all those involved, hence the importance of dissociating from the concept of an "incident" any notion of "error" or "blame" both in internal analysis and in public communications. The nuclear industry has developed some very progressive tools for experience feedback, which could interest also management of other technological risks. This book presents the proceedings of a NATO Advanced Workshop dedicated to this important matter of concern.
650 0 _aENGINEERING.
650 0 _aSYSTEM SAFETY.
650 0 _aNUCLEAR ENGINEERING.
650 0 _aENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.
650 0 _aENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION.
650 1 4 _aENGINEERING.
650 2 4 _aQUALITY CONTROL, RELIABILITY, SAFETY AND RISK.
650 2 4 _aFACILITY MANAGEMENT.
650 2 4 _aNUCLEAR ENGINEERING.
650 2 4 _aEFFECTS OF RADIATION/RADIATION PROTECTION.
650 2 4 _aINDUSTRIAL POLLUTION PREVENTION.
700 1 _aVolkov, Yuri.
_eeditor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9781402038860
830 0 _aNATO Security Through Science Series ;
_v4
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3888-7
_zVer el texto completo en las instalaciones del CICY
912 _aZDB-2-ENG
942 _2ddc
_cER
999 _c60650
_d60650