000			04170nam a22005295i 4500
001			978-1-4020-5961-2
003			DE-He213
005			20251006084527.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			100301s2007 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9781402059612
020			_a99781402059612
024	7		_a10.1007/978-1-4020-5961-2 _2doi
082	0	4	_a120 _223
100	1		_aNottelmann, Nikolaj. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aBlameworthy Belief _h[electronic resource] : _bA Study in Epistemic Deontologism / _cby Nikolaj Nottelmann.
264		1	_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands, _c2007.
300			_bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	1		_aSynthese Library ; _v338
505	0		_aBelief and Acceptance -- Approaching a Conception of Epistemic Blameworthiness -- Blameworthy Belief as Inexcusably Undesirable Belief -- Epistemic Undesirability -- Bruce Russell's Basic Analysis of the Notion of Epistemic Blameworthiness -- Doxastic Control -- Direct Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Voluntarism -- Direct Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Voluntarism -- Indirect Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Pascalianism -- Indirect Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Pascalianism -- Intellectual Obligations -- Foresight and Blameworthy Inadvertence to Risk -- Epistemic Blameworthiness Analysed -- Epistemic Autonomy.
520			_aBelieving the wrong thing may sometimes have drastic consequences. The question as to when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief is an important one: It touches upon the roots of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. The answer to this question may influence the extent to which we are willing to submit each other to punishments ranging from mild resentment to harsh prison terms. This book presents an extensive effort to shed light on the conditions under which we may appropriately deem someone blameworthy for holding a particular belief. It regiments and unifies several debates within contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship. Finally, the book brings a new philosophical look on issues like our power to control beliefs and the extent and nature of foresight. "Blameworthy Belief is unique in being an up-to-date monograph devoted entirely to the problem of a moral appraisal of beliefs and the closely related problem of deciding to believe (doxastic voluntarism and anti-voluntarism). It is bound to become a highly influential work and is of great interest not only to epistemologists, but also to philosophers of law and moral philosophers." Heinrich Wansing, Professor of Philosophy of Science and Logic, Dresden University of Technology, Germany "Nottelmann has nicely managed to weave accounts of competing views into his discussion, and so this book provides an excellent survey of the literature en route to the development of a sensible account of how we could be said to be responsible for believing various things, even though belief formation is not under our voluntary control." John Heil, Professor of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, U.S.A., and Monash University, Australia
650		0	_aPHILOSOPHY (GENERAL).
650		0	_aGENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY.
650		0	_aETHICS.
650		0	_aEDUCATION _xPHILOSOPHY.
650		0	_aPHILOSOPHY OF LAW.
650		0	_aPHILOSOPHY OF MIND.
650	1	4	_aPHILOSOPHY.
650	2	4	_aEPISTEMOLOGY.
650	2	4	_aETHICS.
650	2	4	_aPHILOSOPHY OF LAW.
650	2	4	_aPHILOSOPHY OF MIND.
650	2	4	_aPHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION.
650	2	4	_aPHILOSOPHY.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9781402059605
830		0	_aSynthese Library ; _v338
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5961-2 _zVer el texto completo en las instalaciones del CICY
912			_aZDB-2-SHU
942			_2ddc _cER
999			_c61511 _d61511