000			03461nam a22004695i 4500
001			978-1-4020-6354-1
003			DE-He213
005			20251006084532.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			100301s2007 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9781402063541
020			_a99781402063541
024	7		_a10.1007/978-1-4020-6354-1 _2doi
082	0	4	_a501 _223
100	1		_aDilworth, Craig. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aScientific Progress _h[electronic resource] : _bA Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories / _cby Craig Dilworth.
264		1	_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands, _c2007.
300			_bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	1		_aSynthese Library ; _v153
505	0		_aThe Deductive Model -- The Basis Of The Logical Empiricist Conception Of Science -- The Basis Of The Popperian Conception Of Science -- The Logical Empiricist Conception Of Scientific Progress -- The Popperian Conception Of Scientific Progress -- Popper, Lakatos, And The Transcendence Of The Deductive Model -- Kuhn, Feyerabend, And In Commensurability -- The Gestalt Model -- The Perspectivist Conception Of Science -- Development Of The Perspectivist Conception In The Context Of The Kinetic Theory Of Gases -- The Set-Theoretic Conception Of Science -- Application Of The Perspectivist Conception To The Views Of Newton, Kepler And Galileo.
520			_aKuhn and Feyerabend formulated the problem. Dilworth provides the solution. In this highly original and insightful book, Craig Dilworth answers all the questions raised by the incommensurability thesis. Logical empiricism cannot account for theory conflict. Popperianism cannot account for how one theory is a progression beyond another. Dilworth's Perspectivist conception of science does both. While remaining within the bounds of classical philosophy of science, Dilworth does away with the logicism of his competitors. On the Perspectivist view theory conflict is not contradiction, and theory superiority does not consist in deductive subsumption or set-theoretic inclusion. Here the relation between theories is analogous to the application of individual concepts, and the question of theory superiority becomes one of relative applicability. In this way Dilworth succeeds in providing a conception of science in which scientific progress is based on both rational and empirical considerations. "[Dilworth] convincingly works out how from his point of view it is possible to explain the conflict between two theories as an incompatibility of perspectives, and at the same time avoid sliding into relativism by giving criteria for scientific progress." Dialectica
650		0	_aPHILOSOPHY (GENERAL).
650		0	_aGENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY.
650		0	_aMETAPHYSICS.
650		0	_aSCIENCE _xPHILOSOPHY.
650	1	4	_aPHILOSOPHY.
650	2	4	_aPHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE.
650	2	4	_aEPISTEMOLOGY.
650	2	4	_aMETAPHYSICS.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9781402063534
830		0	_aSynthese Library ; _v153
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6354-1 _zVer el texto completo en las instalaciones del CICY
912			_aZDB-2-SHU
942			_2ddc _cER
999			_c61681 _d61681